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Unlike the selected presenters, I did not earn my participation in this symposium; the privilege
of introducing the symposium papers is mine solely because I served as Chair of the Association
of American Law Schools (AALS) Civil Procedure Section for 2007.  Since 2005, I have served
as a member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.  In this introduction, I speak only for
myself and not for the Section or for the Advisory Committee.  Thanks go to Ed Cooper and
Tom Rowe for reading a draft of this paper.  Any errors or heresies that follow are, of course,
mine and mine alone.
1. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1039 (1982) [hereinafter Burbank, REA] (describing practice under the Conformity Act of
1872).
2. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 922 (1987).
3. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of
State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1427 (1986); see also David
L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1969, 1969 (1989) (“The Federal Rules have not just survived; they have influenced
procedural thinking in every court in this land . . . and indeed have become part of the
consciousness of lawyers, judges, and scholars who worry about and live with issues of judicial
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JUSTNESS! SPEED! INEXPENSE!
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1938
REVISITED:  THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF THE
FEDERAL RULES
STEVEN S. GENSLER*
After taking effect in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal
Rules) have had a rather amazing seventy-year run.  Their adoption
fundamentally transformed the landscape of federal procedure.  Out went the
era of conformity to oftentimes inflexible and technicality-bound state court
practice.1  In came the era of uniform federal procedures modeled after flexible
equity practices.2  But it was not just federal practice that was transformed.
Since 1938, the core tenets of the Federal Rules—including notice pleading,
liberal amendments, and liberal discovery—have exerted a strong influence on
the state-court procedural landscape as well.3  As the original rulemakers had
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procedure.”).
4. See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 307 (1938); see
also Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence,
and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2005-06 (1989).
5. See Oakley & Coon, supra note 3, passim (listing degree of conformity for each state);
see also John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354,
355 (2002) (finding that the trend was against conformity as the states failed to adopt the more
recent amendments to the Federal Rules).
6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note (discussing purpose and principles of
the Style Project).  Not everyone agreed that the makeover was needed, or a good idea.  See,
e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155 (2006).  I
think the project was important and that its long-term net benefits will be substantial.  But that’s
a question that can’t be fully answered for another ten years at least, and even then the
assessment will necessarily be impressionistic given that most of the costs and benefits will not
be tracked and that many of them—e.g., improved understanding—will defy measurement in
any event.
7. Professor Marcus chronicles a representative swatch of these criticisms in his
contribution.  See Richard Marcus, Not Dead Yet, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 299, 299 (2008)
[hereinafter Marcus, Not Dead Yet].  For a more detailed discourse on the rulemaking “crisis,”
see Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 908-12 (2002)
[hereinafter Marcus, Reform].
8. See, e.g., Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice:
Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making
Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1173 (2005) (arguing that the “top-down” model of procedural
reform has failed to achieve the goal of national—including inter-state—uniformity); Linda S.
Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 801-02 (1991) (tracing “demise” of federal rulemaking to the
1988 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, which “politicized” rulemaking by
granting the public access to the rulemaking process).
anticipated,4 the Federal Rules ended up setting something of a national model
for court procedures.  Of course, not all states have adopted that model, and
even in states that have done so generally the state rules can vary significantly
in certain areas.5  But any such variations are inevitably compared to the
Federal Rules and judged against them.
Seventy years is a long time, maybe even a lifetime.  I don’t mean to make
a eulogy.  The Federal Rules remain in effect, and indeed just emerged from
a badly-needed makeover.6  But all eras end.  And for (at least) the past three
decades, both the Federal Rules and the federal rulemaking enterprise have
been beset with criticism.7  Some have suggested that the status of federal
rulemaking as a reform leader reached its zenith years ago and has since
suffered from a long decline.8  Is it really possible that we have seen, or are
presently witnessing, the end of an era?
That question sets the stage for the topic the Executive Committee selected
for the 2008 Annual Meeting Section Program.  Proceeding from the recent
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss2/1
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9. The full text of the Call for Papers read:
XX70 years ago, the Federal Rules changed the landscape of civil litigation.
Procedure in the federal courts became uniform and adopted a flexible, notice-
based model that contemplated liberal access to discovery.  Over time, most states
followed suit.  Some have called this the Golden Age of Rulemaking.
XXWhat will the next 30 years of rulemaking look like?  What should they look
like?  From pleading standards to discovery to summary judgment practice, there
is no shortage of critics of the federal model.  And, increasingly, questions are
raised about the extent to which state practice should continue to follow the lead
of the Federal Rules.  States might adopt different practices out of a belief that the
state and federal courts hear different types of cases and are designed to do
different things.  States might adopt different practices in a spirit of local
experimentation, supplementing or even displacing the federal rulemaking process
as the leader in innovation and reform.  Or, states might simply depart from the
Federal Rules model out of a belief that the federal model proceeds from flawed
first principles.  Different models of judicial federalism could support very
different conclusions about the proper interaction between state rulemaking and
federal rulemaking.
2008 Annual Program, The Revolution of 1938 Revisited: The Role and Future of the
Federal Rules, FALL 2007 NEWSLETTER (Ass’n of Am. Law Sch. Section on Civil
Procedure), Nov. 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.aals.org/documents/sections/civilprocedure/CivProSectionaalsnewsletterfall2007
.pdf.
10. Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of 1938 and Its Discontents,
62 OKLA. L. REV. 275 (2008).
11. Id. at 275.
criticisms of the Federal Rules and federal rulemaking, and following up the
suggestion that both are past their prime, the Executive Committee issued a
Call for Papers on the following topic:  “The Revolution of 1938 Revisited:
The Role and Future of the Federal Rules.”  We broadly defined the topic as
questioning whether the Federal Rules and the federal rulemaking process
were still equipped to lead rules reform in the United States.9  Alternatively
put, if one accepted that the Federal Rules had been leading the way for the
last seventy years, what was the outlook for the next thirty years?  From an
impressive group of submissions, the Executive Committee selected three
papers for presentation at the annual meeting.  They are introduced here in the
order in which they were delivered at the AALS program.
Professors Rex Perschbacher and Debra Lyn Bassett lead us off with their
paper titled The Revolution of 1938 and Its Discontents.10  Directly taking on
the challenge posed in the Call for Papers, they assess the current state of
rulemaking and conclude that the Federal Rules developed in 1938 were a
product of their time and that their “moment” is over.11  To be precise,
Perschbacher and Bassett contend that while the 1938 rules perfectly captured
the yearning of that era to refocus on getting to the merits, they now chafe
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
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12. Id. at 276-77.
13. Id. at 276.
14. Id. at 275.
15. Id. at 292; see also id. at 285-86.
16. Id. at 286-91 (discussing the rise in private adjudication modes like arbitration and rent-
a-judge).
17. Id. at 286, 292.
18. Id. at 278-79.
against the modern obsession with case management and judicial efficiency.12
As Perschbacher and Bassett see it, the Revolution of 1938 ended when the
dominant litigation value stopped being to advance disputes to the merits fairly
(and efficiently) and turned into “ending litigation at all costs.”13  Perschbacher
and Bassett invoke the imagery of the French Revolution, equating the
transformation of the Federal Rules with the Thermidorian Reaction,14 in
which Robespierre fell victim to his own guillotine after taking his
revolutionary ideals and bloody tactics too far for the tastes of the masses.  In
this metaphor, it is the spirit of the 1938 rules that loses its head, only instead
of suffering a swift and public execution the spirit of the 1938 rules has been
gradually and quietly deposed by a thirty-year change in attitude.
In large part, Perschbacher and Bassett’s article is a valediction, one in
which they bid a sad farewell to the litigation values that they saw as forming
the heart of the 1938 rules.  This sentiment is most clearly expressed in a
paragraph in which they contrast the way that litigation was perceived in 1938
with the way it is perceived today.  In 1938, they assert, the original drafters
viewed litigation as a positive and worthwhile endeavor; thus, the goal of the
original drafters was to facilitate litigation by removing the technicalities that
plagued code pleading, as well as by adding a liberal discovery scheme.15  In
contrast, Perschbacher and Bassett perceive a very different attitude towards
litigation today—namely, that litigation is a bad thing, such that the dominant
goal is to find ways to minimize our investment in litigation16 and resolve
those cases that do get litigated as quickly and cheaply as possible.17
Perschbacher and Bassett’s article is not a call to arms.  Given their
fondness for the values underlying the 1938 rules, one might have anticipated
a clear call to reinstate the 1938 regime and usher in a return to the good old
days.  Instead, Perschbacher and Bassett explore a number of reasons why a
return to the 1938 rules is unlikely.  Principally, they  chronicle how the
federal judiciary and the federal docket have changed since 1938,
metamorphosing from a relatively small cadre of 179 district judges with
roughly 100,000 pending cases to now comprise 667 district judges with
320,000 pending cases.18  They also point to a stark change in what the judges
do: whereas 22.3% of cases reached trial in 1938, a mere 1.3% did so in
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss2/1
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19. Id. at 279.
20. Id. at 279-84.
21. Professor Marcus makes a similar point in his paper, noting that the conditions that
gave rise to (or at least gave fuel to) the “Big Bang” of 1938 are unlikely to occur again any
time soon.  See Marcus, Not Dead Yet, supra note 7, at 303.  For related commentary linking
the Revolution of 1938 with the principles underlying the New Deal, see Laurens Walker, The
End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1272-80
(1997).
22. Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 10, at 292-93.
23. Id. at 277.
24. Marcus, Not Dead Yet, supra note 7.
25. Id. at 311-13.
26. Id. at 313-14 (discussing the support provided by the Rules Committee Support Office
and the Federal Judicial Center).
2006.19  Perschbacher and Bassett also carefully develop the thesis that 1938
presented a kind of perfect storm of reform factors, including the
contemporaneous development of the modern Erie Doctrine and its preference
for vertical uniformity rather than horizontal uniformity in substantive law.20
While not expressly stated, the implication is that the conditions required to
return to the 1938 values simply don’t exist in today’s world of larger courts,
crowded dockets, and managerial judges.21  Later in the paper, Perschbacher
and Bassett discuss Congress’s increasing meddling with federal procedure.22
This discussion suggests a fear that any attempt to retreat from active case
management would prompt Congress to intervene in ways that prevent the
1938 values from retaking the throne or, worse yet, that crown an even worse
regime than the efficiency-driven system that developed during the past thirty
years.
Whatever the reason, Perschbacher and Bassett stop short of calling for
another revolution—one that would reinstate the deposed 1938 rules regime.
While they briefly raise the prospect that a “tweaking” or “updating” might be
enough to save the spirit of the 1938 rules,23 they do so tepidly and without
conviction.  In the end, their paper seems more of a resigned farewell than a
rallying cry.  And as a farewell, it has a ring of finality—sounding more
“adieu” than “au revoir”—suggesting their belief that the spirit of the 1938
rules is not merely in exile, but rather is gone for good.
Professor Marcus interrupts the processional, declaring that the Federal
Rules are Not Dead Yet.24  Indeed, due principally to the structural advantages
of national-scope reform activities25 and the resource wealth that has
accumulated around the federal rulemaking enterprise,26 Marcus proclaims that
the Federal Rules have been endowed with a hardiness far beyond that of most
septuagenarians.  Citing the recent E-Discovery amendments as evidence,
Marcus suggests that there is reason to believe that the Federal Rules—and the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
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27. Id. at 314-18.
28. In the past, a number of commentators have complained of a lack of meaningful
cooperation between the rulemakers and Congress.  See Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing
Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 222 (1997) [hereinafter
Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change]; Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm
Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1169
(1996).  Newly enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 502 reflects the sort of inter-branch
cooperation that these critics hoped to see.  During the development of the E-Discovery rules,
one of the consistent concerns voiced by litigants was the cost and time consumed by privilege
review of electronic documents.  See Need for Change Balanced by Deliberate Pace: An
Interview with Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts,
Washington, D.C.), March 2008, http://www.uscourts.gov/ ttb/2008-03/article01.cfm.  The E-
Discovery amendments included changes to Rules 16(b) and 26(f) to spur litigants to think
about ways of addressing the issue.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26 & advisory committee’s notes.
And Rule 26(b)(5) was amended to create a mechanism for litigants to alert the other parties
when they had made an inadvertent disclosure of privileged material and to place a hold on the
use of that material until a court ruled on the questions of privilege and waiver.  But the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee made no attempt to alter any of the underlying law of privilege or
waiver, due to Rules Enabling Act limits and concern that the topic might properly lie with the
Evidence Rules Advisory Committee.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000) (“Any such rule
creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless
approved by Act of Congress.”).  Thus, the need for further reform remained.  See S. REP. NO.
110-264, at 1-3 (2008).  At the behest of the House Judiciary Committee Chair in 2006, the
Judicial Conference tasked the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee with developing a proposal
to address privilege and waiver.  See Letter from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, to Senator Patrick J. Leahy and Senator Arlen Specter (Sept. 26,
2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Hill_Letter_re_EV_502.pdf.  The proposal
was forwarded to the Senate and proposed as Senate Bill 2450.  See S. 2450 110th Cong.
(2007).  The Bill passed both houses of Congress and was signed by the President on September
19, 2008.  See 154 CONG. REC. S8373-01 (2008); see also 154 CONG. REC. H7817-01 (2008)
(presentation in House, including Statement of Congressional Intent).  The cooperative process
used to develop and implement Federal Rule of Evidence 502 follows a path suggested by
Professor Burbank among others.  See Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change, supra, at
249; Burbank, REA, supra note 1, at 1195 n.775.
29. In other writing, Professor Marcus has cautioned people against expecting modern
rulemaking to produce the types of dramatic breakthroughs and reforms associated with the
1938 revolution.  See Marcus, Reform, supra note 7, at 943-44.
30. Marcus, Not Dead Yet, supra note 7, at 318.
federal rulemaking process—are in a period of renaissance rather than retreat.27
(Marcus might also have cited to the recent cooperation between Congress and
the Judicial Conference to create Federal Rule of Evidence 502.28)  Federal
rulemaking may have its limits,29 but within those limits Marcus sees more
reason for hope than despair.30
More fundamentally, Marcus contests the idea that the “good old days” of
1938 ever left us.  In particular, Marcus questions the view that the discovery
and case management reforms since 1983 have retreated from the “Liberal
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss2/1
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31. Id. at 305-06.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 308.
34. Professor Subrin similarly identifies 1970 as the “apex” of the “spirit of extensive
attorney latitude” in discovery.  See Subrin, supra note 4, at 2022.
35. Most trace the beginnings of the backlash against discovery to Chief Justice Burger’s
remarks at the 1976 Pound Conference, where he noted “widespread complaints” of the misuse
and abuse of pretrial procedures.  See The Honorable Warren E. Burger, Keynote Address, 70
F.R.D. 79, 95-96.  See generally Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery – The
Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (1992) (discussing criticisms of the discovery process);
Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. LAW. REV. 747, 753-68 (1998)
(chronicling multiple rounds of “discovery containment” efforts that followed Chief Justice
Burger’s remarks).  For a hot-off-the-presses call for another round of discovery reform to
address the costs of E-Discovery and other issues that are claimed to have “broken” the
discovery system, see Interim Report on the Joint Project of The American College of Trial
Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and The Institute for the Advancement of the American
Legal System (Aug. 1, 2008), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=
Ethos” embodied by the 1938 rules.31  Marcus agrees that the discovery and
case management reforms since 1980 represent a pullback from the most
liberal pretrial practices.  But according to Marcus, these were a retreat not
from the 1938 rules or their underlying values but from reforms in the 1960s
and 1970s that  removed even the minimal discovery limits contained in the
original 1938 rules.32  Marcus argues that, while the reforms since 1980 have
empowered judges to control lawyers, the Federal Rules remain loyal to the
notions of notice pleading and liberal discovery.  Thus, what the critics of the
changes since 1980 are actually upset about is not that the 1938 values have
been discarded, but that the 1970s movement to even more liberal discovery
did not stick.33
If Marcus is right, perhaps that makes the reference to the Thermidorian
Reaction all the more apt, albeit with a small tweak.  When Robespierre was
guillotined on the evening of 10 Thermidor, year 2 (July 28, 1794), it was not
because of any backlash to the ideals of the French Revolution, often denoted
by the slogan “Liberté! Egalité! Fraternité!”  Rather, it was a reaction to the
Reign of Terror that had taken place under Robespierre’s control of the
Committee of Public Safety.  Marcus’s point is that the reforms since 1980
were a reaction to what he calls the “apogee” of the Liberal Ethos, which
occurred not in 1938 but in 1970.34  If that is the case, then Professors
Perschbacher and Bassett may well be correct to characterize the reforms since
1980 as a type of Thermidorian Reaction, but in this version the role of
Robespierre is played by the forces of discovery unleashed during the 1970
apogee (with a guest appearance by the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 as St.
Just).  There are certainly those who saw (and still see) “unbridled discovery”
as its own Reign of Terror.35
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
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All_Publications&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=3650.
36. Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 62 OKLA.
L. REV. 319 (2008) [hereinafter Bone, Making Effective Rules].
37. See Clark, supra note 4, at 304, 306.
38. Bone, Making Effective Rules, supra note 36, at 323.
39. Id. at 326-27.
40. Id. at 320.
41. Bone’s full thesis is broader than I describe here.  He also argues that the rulemakers
must directly confront the role of settlement and the value of participation.  Id. at 334-40.
While these areas are worthy of their own examination, I have focused on his comments
regarding the substance-procedure relationship both because they comprise the bulk of his
argument and because I think they strike closest to the heartland of ascertaining the role of the
rulemakers.
42. Id. at 329.
In the final paper in this symposium, Making Effective Rules:  The Need for
Procedure Theory, Professor Robert Bone looks to the future of federal
rulemaking and challenges us to rethink how we make and evaluate the
Federal Rules.36  In 1938, the prevailing view was that procedure and
substance were separate, such that the drafting of procedural rules was seen as
a matter of technical expertise rather than policy.  From the so-called
“Handmaid” viewpoint,37 it was only natural that court rules would be drafted
by procedural experts and designed to advance procedural values like
maximizing flexibility or minimizing delay and cost.38  But today, Bone
argues, now that we see clearly the interconnection between procedure and
substance, the original “procedural values” justification for the design of the
rules is no longer convincing or sufficient.  Worse yet, Bone asserts, no other
norms or values have developed to fill the void.  The result, Bone contends, is
that the Advisory Committee, lacking any compass to guide it, has developed
a habit of sidestepping the hard questions by deferring to consensus or, where
no consensus can be had, by drafting general rules that leave the hard
questions to trial judge discretion.39
Bone seeks to fill the void.  He asserts that the federal rulemakers must
develop normative metrics drawn from “core features of litigation practice” to
assess future rule changes.40  And to do that, Bone argues, the rulemakers must
directly confront the relationship between substance and procedure.41
Bone begins with the premise that whatever else rules should strive to do,
they must strive to yield “quality” outcomes, with quality defined as
conformity to the substantive law.42  In other words, “good rules” will yield
correct legal outcomes.  While that may seem substance-neutral on the surface,
Bone explains that the quest for quality outcomes leads inevitably to value
questions that depend on the underlying substance.  First, because we do not
insist that rights be enforced regardless of cost, outcome quality must be
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss2/1
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43. Id. at 331-32.
44. Id. at 332-33.  For a more complete discussion of this approach, see Robert G. Bone,
The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural
Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 935-37 (1999) [hereinafter Bone, Process of Making Process].
45. Bone, Making Effective Rules, supra note 36, at 332.
46. Id. at 333-34.
47. See Bone, Process of Making Process, supra note 44, at 938.
48. The Advisory Committee’s ability to fulfill that role may be just the tip of the iceberg.
While the Advisory Committee bears the frontline responsibility for considering amendments,
it does not have the authority to enact anything.  Rather, its proposals are forwarded up the
defined—at least in part—by how well a rule enforces the policies underlying
those rights in the absence of full enforcement.43  Thus, Bone says, the
rulemakers must identify the policies that the substantive law seeks to
promote.  Second, because outcome errors are inevitable, procedural rules
must seek to minimize the worst types of errors.44  And to avoid the worst
errors, Bone says, the rulemakers must place relative values on different
substantive rights to know how to distribute error risks away from the rights
that we consider most important.45  In summary, while Bone agrees that the
pursuit of outcome quality can justify procedural rules, he cautions that any
meaningful justification based on outcome quality is not substance-neutral
because it still requires the rulemakers to consider substantive values in at least
two ways: (1) to determine what makes an outcome a “quality” outcome; and
(2) to distribute error risks according to the relative importance of the
underlying substantive values.  Bone then argues that once one starts looking
for justification in substantive values, it is no longer tenable to cling to the
principle of rule trans-substantivity.46  Thus, the case for substantive
justification becomes, at least in some sense, the case for adopting substance-
specific rules.
Professor Bone’s thesis is provocative on several levels.  If nothing else, his
vision of an Advisory Committee actively engaged in identifying substantive
values, assessing their relative importance, and striving to write rules that
maximize the most important values is sure to provoke a wide range of
responses.  Those of us who have had the good fortune to be involved in the
rulemaking process probably should resist any temptation to take Bone’s
proposal as a vote of confidence in our abilities.  In earlier work, Bone has
examined whether Congress or a centralized rules committee would be better
suited to perform such a task, and he concluded that it was the committee.47
But that conclusion is perhaps more accurately seen not as a vote of
confidence for the Advisory Committee but as a vote of no confidence in
Congress.  Needless to say, even if one agrees that a centralized rules
committee could do the task better than Congress, that does not lead to the
conclusion that a centralized committee could perform the task easily or well.48
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
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approval process to, respectively, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
the United States Judicial Conference, the United States Supreme Court, and Congress.  See
Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1671-
75 (1995) (describing rules amendment process).  It is not immediately apparent to me what role
any of these other entities would have in (1) making the substantive policy choices Bone
envisions; or (2) scrutinizing the Advisory Committee’s proposals for fidelity to those choices.
49. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941).  It is unnecessary here to
consider arguments regarding whether the courts possess inherent authority over certain aspects
of rulemaking.  See, e.g., Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1472-82 (1994) (discussing extent to which court rulemaking
power is an exercise of delegated versus inherent power).
50. Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934).
51. Id. 
52. Depending on one’s view, that proviso may take back some of the rulemaking authority
granted in § 2072(a), or it may simply restate and emphasize a limit inherent in § 2072(a).
Compare Burbank, REA, supra note 1, at 1107-08 (limiting proviso is “surplusage”), with John
Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 718-19 (1974) (grant and
The task Bone envisions would be daunting, even for the “giants” of
rulemaking from the past.  And the idea that the current members of the
Advisory Committee (giants or not) would undertake that effort is likely to be
as frightening to some observers as it is tantalizing to its proponent.
Bone’s proposal is provocative in yet another sense—it provokes renewed
and serious consideration of a number of questions that go to the heart of
rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act.  Without meaning to limit what
those questions might be, I briefly explore four of them in the following
discussion.  These thoughts are not offered as an exhaustive critique (and
certainly not as a criticism), but rather to give some content to my claim of
“provocation.”
First.  Bone’s proposal raises a fundamental question about the role of the
rulemakers.  Specifically: what is the job Congress gave them?  As readers of
this symposium will already know, the rulemaking process exists as an
exercise of power delegated from Congress via the Rules Enabling Act.49  So
what exactly is it that Congress asked the Court to do?  Starting with the text
of the original Rules Enabling Act, Congress described the job this way:  “to
prescribe, by general rules . . . the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and
motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law.”50  Of course,
Congress added this proviso: any such rules “shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor
modify the substantive rights of any litigant.”51
The text of the original Rules Enabling Act says rather little about what
norms the rulemakers should advance through the Federal Rules.  Most
discussions of the Enabling Act focus on the scope of the delegation; they are
attempts to define the boundaries of permissible rulemaking, as set either by
the grant of rulemaking power or the limiting proviso.52  Our focus here,
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however, is to identify rulemaking criteria within the Enabling Act limits.  (I
will return later to what traditional Erie jurisprudence might have to say about
this topic.)
In this context, the only drafting directive in the original Rules Enabling Act
is the instruction that the rulemakers proceed “by general rules.”  While this
language seems inexorably to lead us into the debate about substance-specific
rules,53 I need not rehearse that debate here.  As scholars on both sides of the
question have noted, both the legitimacy and the wisdom of substance-specific
rules are likely questions of degree.54  That is to say, one can accept that the
Federal Rules can and should have specialized provisions for some matters,
while still articulating generally applicable rules in the main.  It therefore
seems sufficient for these purposes to note that the enterprise proposed by
Bone assumes (he might say, “positively yields”) an unspecified number of
new substance-specific rules.  Whether one sees the end result as consistent
with the text of the Rules Enabling Act would then likely depend on just how
many—and perhaps also on which kinds of—substance-specific rules would
emerge from the process Bone envisions.  Beyond that question, however, the
text of the Rules Enabling Act yields no normative directives for drafting the
Rules.
If we go beyond the text of the 1934 Rules Enabling Act, we might find
other clues about what rulemaking norms Congress might have had in mind
when it tasked the Court with crafting the Federal Rules.  One can find in the
legislative history of the Rules Enabling Act—Professor Burbank’s
“antecedent period of travail”—evidence that the proponents of court
rulemaking expected the rulemakers to focus on writing rules that would be
simpler to follow, reduce cost and delay, and promote the resolution of cases
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based on the merits rather than technicalities.55  That is how the Supreme Court
characterized the mission in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., its first case to discuss
the Enabling Act, commenting that “the new policy envisaged in the enabling
act of 1934 was that the whole field of court procedure be regulated in the
interest of speedy, fair and exact determination of the truth.”56
This is where Bone attempts to forge a new conceptual path.  Accepting that
“justness” is a valid goal, Bone argues that the rulemakers cannot measure
“justness” without treading into the realm of substantive values.  To put it in
Bone’s terms, because perfect “justness” is not obtainable, courts must attempt
to maximize the justness that is realistically attainable by maximizing the
attainment of the values underlying substantive law and by minimizing error
costs in the substantive areas deemed most important.  One could hardly
quarrel with Bone about whether that is one way of measuring justness.
Perhaps it might even be the optimal way.  But is that what Congress was
envisioning when it delegated rulemaking authority to the Court?  Nothing like
that appears in either the text of the Rules Enabling Act or the record from the
“antecedent period of travail.”  Even accounting for changes in vocabulary
between that era and our own, one finds little to suggest that Congress equated
the goal of justness in the rules with a rulemaking process driven by normative
metrics, the policy values underlying substantive laws, or the distribution of
error costs according to the rulemakers’ beliefs about which substantive laws
were most important.
Second.  Regardless of what Congress thought in 1934, one must consider
whether subsequent developments have altered or clarified the task assigned
to the rulemakers.  As Bone explains, we no longer live in a world that accepts
the Handmaid model of procedural rules.  Perhaps Congress’s views about
rulemaking have changed as well.  But while Congress has amended the Rules
Enabling Act several times since 1934, the picture does not seem to have
changed.  For example, while the Rules Enabling Act was altered when it was
incorporated into title 28 as part of the 1948 revision of the judicial code, none
of those alterations suggest any change to the rulemakers’ mission.57  Of
course, the most significant development in the life of the Rules Enabling Act
occurred when Congress re-authorized it in 1988.  Yet even if we focus on
Congress’s intent in 1988, there is good reason to believe that Congress was
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at least as attached—if not more so—to the view that the rulemakers stick to
procedural values and not venture into substantive concerns.58
One more piece of evidence is worth noting.  In 1956, the Supreme Court
discharged the Advisory Committee created under the 1934 Act.59  Two years
later, Congress reconstituted the Advisory Committee scheme by moving it to
the Judicial Conference of the United States.60  By statute, Congress directed
the Judicial Conference to “carry on a continuous study of the operation and
effect of the general rules of practice and procedure” and to make
recommendations to the Supreme Court.61  Thus, “[t]he Supreme Court
retained its statutory authority to promulgate the rules, but it would henceforth
do so by acting on recommendations made by the Judicial Conference.”62  The
Act transferring the frontline responsibility for rulemaking from the Court to
the Judicial Conference expressly directs the Judicial Conference to
recommend “[s]uch changes in and additions to those rules as the Conference
may deem desirable to promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in
administration, the just determination of litigation, and the elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay.”63  Here too, there is nary a whisper about
normative metrics, maximizing the policy values underlying different
substantive laws, or the distribution of error costs away from the rights deemed
by the rulemakers to be the most treasured or fundamental.
Third.  Bone’s proposal raises important questions about the relationship
between our “Erie” jurisprudence and rulemaking.  Bone emphasizes that,
unlike the original drafters, modern procedural thinkers no longer believe that
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there is a clear line between substance and procedure.64  Indeed, it is now
generally accepted that one cannot draft rules based on the so-called
procedural values without exerting some tug or pull at substance.65  For many
years, one of the vexing questions for procedural scholars (and judges, of
course) has been to try to determine how much of an impact the Federal Rules
may have on substance before they are found to exceed the rulemaking
authority conferred by the Rules Enabling Act.66  So Bone is surely right that
modern views on the ephemeral line between substance and procedure say
something about the rulemaking enterprise.  And one important manifestation
lies in determining the outer limits of rulemaking power.
But does it also speak to rulemaking within the Rules Enabling Act limits,
and if so, how?  The “Erie” scholarship noted above seeks to map the outer
limits of rulemaking power, whereas Bone’s thesis urges the rulemakers to
develop normative, substance-attentive standards for choosing rule content
from among the options located within the Enabling Act limits.  In other
words, Bone sees the difficulties in the substance-procedure relationship not
just as a basis to cabin rulemaking, but to inform it.  Those are very different
questions that might best be kept separate.  One can accept that the absence of
any clear divide between substance and procedure makes it difficult to define
the outer boundaries of court rulemaking without also accepting that Congress
has directed the rulemakers—in the pursuit of “justness”—to attempt to
determine and weight the policy choices animating the substantive laws that
the rules will be used to enforce.
Fourth.  Finally, Bone’s proposal prompts us to consider whether the Rules
Enabling Act strikes the right note in terms of delegated authority.  Underlying
Bone’s thesis is, I think, a belief that the traditional procedural values are not
sufficient to justify or guide rulemaking and that therefore rulemakers ought
to work from a different set of instructions—one that includes some of the
normative principles he suggests.67  Within as-yet undefined delegation limits,
Congress certainly might see fit to pass a new Rules Enabling Act along those
lines.  But let’s not be too hasty to toss aside the traditional procedural values.
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Rulemaking that flows from our Rule 1 ideals—the just, speedy, and
inexpensive administration of the law—is not without its benefits.68  As all
three of our presenters noted, Congress is well aware of its power to legislate
procedure directly and has become more active in doing so.69  A uniform rule
designed to promote efficiency and accuracy creates a clear baseline against
which Congress can superimpose—by substantive or procedural
legislation—the types of substantive concerns Bone raises.70  Indeed, I suspect
that to be the type of dynamic that Congress envisioned when it re-authorized
the Rules Enabling Act in 1988.  And, of course, there is the persistent (and,
I think, substantial) risk that overt consideration of substantive policies might
erode the credibility of the rulemaking process while, ultimately, serving only
to invite even greater meddling by Congress.71
At the risk of being selectively anecdotal, it also bears mentioning that
modern rule-drafting and rulemaking bodies continue to invoke the norms of
justness, speed, and efficiency.  The American Law Institute recently approved
certain parts of the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, including a
section titled, “General Principles for Aggregate Litigation.”  As presented in
April, section 1.03 provided:
Aggregation should further the pursuit of justice under the law by:
(a) promoting the efficient use of litigation resources;
(b) enforcing substantive rights and responsibilities;
(c) facilitating binding resolutions of civil disputes; and
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(d) facilitating the accurate and just resolution of civil disputes
by trial and settlement.72
Though there are differences, these general principles bear a strong relation to
the goals Professor Bone attributes to the original drafters and memorialized
in Federal Rule 1.73  A more direct example is found in New South Wales’s
Civil Procedure Act of 2005.  In a section titled “Overriding purpose,” the Act
states: “The overriding purpose of this Act and of rules of court, in their
application to civil proceedings, is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap
resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.”74  While these few modern
equivalents certainly do not establish that a procedural values approach is the
only possible approach, or even the best possible approach, they do illustrate
that the procedural values approach remains viable in the minds of many even
in a world enlightened about the impact of procedure on substance.
All of this is not to say that rulemaking must lash itself to the mast of
procedural values, cutting itself off from all other considerations lest they
prove too tempting.  Ignorance in the content of rulemaking is surely as great
a sin as ignorance in the allocation of rulemaking power.75  Nor is there any
reason to operate in a “procedural values bubble”; nothing about a procedural
values-driven approach precludes either the awareness or the consideration of
complementary norms.  What I do mean to say, though, is that the quest to
define “good” rulemaking must begin by recognizing that it is within
Congress’s power to define what “good” means.  And in determining how
Congress might have defined “good”—either in 1934 or today—one must
account for the historical evidence and policy reasons that would support a
finding that Congress envisioned rules designed to promote a more traditional
view of the so-called procedural values.
* * *
After seventy years, and in light of the criticisms raised during the past few
decades, the current health of the federal rulemaking enterprise is a fair matter
for debate.  So too is its future.  Important questions remain to be answered
regarding the success of rulemaking today and the path that rulemaking will
follow in the next thirty years.  The symposium contributions of Professors
Perschbacher and Bassett, Marcus, and Bone provide valuable insights into
these questions and are sure to stimulate and inform the continuing dialogue.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss2/1
2008] THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL RULES 273
76. Carrington, supra note 66, at 300.
77. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 59, § 1008.
78. See Marcus, Of Babies, supra note 54, at 813.
In this Introduction, I have indulged the reference—first made by Professors
Perschbacher and Bassett—to the French Revolution and the Thermidorian
Reaction.  Such conceits can turn quickly to silliness, but I find myself drawn
back to it when I think about the rallying cry of the French Revolution:
“Liberté! Egalité! Fraternité!”  To the extent the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have a rallying cry, it is found in Rule 1 and it is this: “Justness!
Speed!  Inexpense!”  While these terms are not to be found in the text of the
Rules Enabling Act, they are, as Professor Carrington has noted, the “aims of
that movement” and an “expression of an ideal.”76  And as guideposts for
rulemaking, they are ideals which “in the main ha[ve] been faithfully observed
by the rulemakers over the years.”77
One is unlikely to hear those ideals shouted from the barricades these days.
Indeed, in the eyes of some, they may be a construct made weary by time and
familiarity.78  Yet I think they remain a powerful call.  Who doesn’t want their
procedural system to produce just results quickly and cheaply?  If there is
agreement among our contributors, it may be that the future of federal
rulemaking depends not on finding new ideals but on fidelity to the ones we
have (though of course they vary in how they define and assess fidelity).  I
hope it is not too glib to say that, if the rulemaking enterprise should fail in the
next thirty years, it won’t be for lack of an inspiring slogan.
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